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I. The Chronology of the Crisis:
The first overt signs of trouble in Korea were evident in 1996, when the current account
deficit widened from 2% of GNP in 1995 to 5% in 1996, the rate of growth of exports slowed down
from a phenomenal 31% to a merely high 15% and that of GNP declined from an exceedingly high
14.6% to a very high 7.1%. At the same time, foreign debt rose from a 78 billion dollars (62% of
exports) in 1995 to 100 billion dollars (76% of exports) in 1996, most of it1 short term. The
slowdown in exports was due in part to: a loss of competitiveness arising from the relative
appreciation of Korea’s currency because of the drastic decline of the yen; a recession in Japan and
Europe; and a precipitous drop in the world prices of computer chips, ships, automobiles and
garments, which affected over 50% of Korea’s total exports. Exporters of these products were
therefore losing money on their exports. Together with increases in domestic wages and high
domestic interest rates, these losses put a squeeze on corporate profits, which let to a surge in
corporate failures. In January of 1997, despite a massive rescue attempt, Hanbo steel, the 14th
largest chaebol in terms of assets and 17th largest in terms of sales, went into bankruptcy. This was
followed by the failure of the Sammi group, another steel producer. Next came two major affiliates
of the Jinro group, the 19th largest chaebol, that defaulted on their debts in April. They were
succeeded by the Dainong retail chain and by the Ssangyong business group, the sixth largest. In
July 1997, Kia motors, the third largest Korean auto maker, went into default. The stock market
responded by a precipitous decline; by mid-November, it had dropped 50% from its mid-1997 high.
The won went into a freefall on November 19th, when the won tumbled 50% during a two week
span after the daily band for its fluctuation was widened from 8 to 10% and the government
announced that it would henceforth refrain from intervening in currency markets; currently, the won
is about 75% below its high in mid-1997. As Korea’s financial troubles mounted, the government
asked the IMF and other international agencies for standby loans in mid-November; the largest
international financial rescue package to date was approved by the IMF board during the first week
of December. Nevertheless, Korea’s bonds were downgraded by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
from A1 status to junk-bond status on December 11, when the  IMF forced disclosure of the true
state of Korea’s usable external reserves and it became apparent that they were inadequate to cover
the debt coming due before the end of the year.  The down-grading of Korean bonds made them
ineligible for portfolio-investment by international banks.  The banks not only could not renew
maturing loans, but started withdrawing funds from Korea to the tune of a billion a day. The swing
in foreign lending from plus $100 between January and October of 1997 to minus $20 billion by the
end of the year was catastrophic.  With IMF and US help, talks on debt rollover with international
commercial banks were started on December 29-30 1997. On January 17th US secretary of the
Treasury stated that Korea had stabilized, but the President elect, Kim Dae Jung, warned that in
adjustment under IMF conditions " the worst is yet to come".  On January 29th of 1998, agreement
between Korea and international commercial lenders was reached on a rollover of $60 billion of its
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debt, on favorable terms: the maturity of its debt was extended to between one and three years, at
between 2.25 and 2.75 percentage points above the six month London Interbank Rate, with 80
percent of loans between two and three year’s maturity, and the banks received government
guarantees on $24 billion of the debt. Nevertheless the crisis worsened. After a landmark agreement
with the union to allow firing of workers was reached, as part of IMF adjustment conditions, a
general strike called for February 11th was cancelled. In February, one third of its merchant banks
were closed, but deposits were guaranteed. Problem loans at banks were 6% of all loans and non-
performing loans, on which payments were overdue by more than three months were between 15
and 20 percent.  The debt default ratio was 62% in February, as compared to 53% in January and
1.5% in December of 1997, with over 10,000 firms defaulting on payments since last December.
Industrial output in February was 1.9 percentage points lower than a year ago; during February, the
rate of growth of output was negative in February.  Since then, the crisis has abated and been
replaced by a depression and Korea has been engaged in fundamental restructuring of its financial
and corporate sectors.
The origins of the present Korean financial crisis are complex. Several elements have
combined to generate it: vulnerabilities to external shocks, both inherent and strategy-induced;
institutional inadequacies, both domestic and global; domestic policy mistakes; and exogenous
shocks originating in the external environment. Individually, none of these would have been
sufficient to generate the financial meltdown experienced by Korea between October 1977 and mid-
March 1998. In the absence of substantial capital-market liberalization, the policy mistakes and
domestic institutional inadequacies in Korea would merely have resulted in a recession, as they  did
during  the previous corporate financial crises of 1972, 1980-81, and 1992. In the absence of
exogenous shocks stemming from prolonged recession in Japan and Europe and contagion from
financial crises in other East Asian countries the mistaken real appreciation of the won and
consequent slowdown in exports and economic growth, which made Korea more vulnerable to
shocks, would not have taken place. And, if the financial crisis had not been as severe, once it got
going, Korea would not have had to submit to the overly stringent and partially mistakenly
conceived IMF conditionality which, despite being accompanied by the largest financial-rescue
package in IMF history to date, did not succeed in stemming the crisis and will slow down Korea’s
recovery and increase its pain. It took the combination of these factors to produce the magnitude of
financial and economic disaster of 1997-98.
We now proceed to the analysis of each of the ingredients of the Korea financial crisis, in
turn.
II. Strategy Induced Vulnerabilities:
First, the development strategy pursued by Korea, of export-led growth, transformed the
economy from one in which exports were of marginal importance into one in which they have
become vital. As emphasized by Stiglitz (1998), small open economies are inherently vulnerable to
exogenous shocks.  While Korea is now the 11th largest trading economy in the world and the third
largest developing country, and thus does not qualify for the label "small", it is certainly extremely
open, with the sum of exports and imports2 in 1995 being 56% of its gross domestic product. The
openness of the economy makes it very sensitive to influences originating in the global economy,
such as price shocks (e.g. oil) and slowdown in the growth of international trade.
In the crisis of 1997-98, the specific exogenous shocks to Korea were a lengthy recession in
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Japan and a worldwide decline in demand for computer chips, ships, automobiles, and garments.
These impacted upon the value of its overall exports, their profitability and their competitiveness
and led to a mild recession during the first two quarters of 1997, from which the economy was
starting to recover.  Japan’s economic slowdown had started in 1990, and had led to a steadily
declining exchange rate of the yen relative to the dollar; by  mid-1997, the yen had declined to
about 45% of its value in 1994. Since Korea’s nominal exchange rate was (loosely) pegged to the
dollar, Japan’s declining real exchange rate meant an automatic currency appreciation of the won.
Korea’s trade weighted real exchange rate appreciated by 12 percentage points between 1990 and
19963. This caused a decrease in the rate of growth in the value of Korea’s exports and, if dollar
prices were reduced to maintain competitiveness, a reduction in their profitability.  It was the
decline in Korea’s competitiveness, rather than the reduction in the rate of growth of her exports to
Japan, which was the critical element since, in 1995, Korea’s exports to Japan were only 13.6% of
her total exports. But Japan was Korea’s nearest competitor for more than 50% of its exports.
Nevertheless, the shocks arising from both sources were significant.
After mid-1997, one must add contagion from  the financial crises in Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore to the exogenous shocks emanating from Japan and decline in world
demand for a large share of Korea’s exports. The contagion took three forms: a decrease in exports
to these countries, which, in 1995, had accounted for 7% of Korea’s exports; increased competition
for its exports due to the precipitous fall in the value of their currencies; and a re-evaluation of
Korea’s creditworthiness by international banks.  Of these effects, the latter was clearly the most
important.
Second, the major instrument used by Korea’s government to promote exports was its
management of the allocation of bank-credit.  This instrument was wielded through government-
control over subsidized loans made first, by the government-owned banks and, next, through
continued government-influence over private-bank loans coupled with interest-rate ceilings. This
instrument was made all the more potent by the  relative underdevelopment of Korea’s financial
system, which made non-bank sources of credit scarce. As indicated in our previous chapter, the
stock market and non-financial intermediaries were underdeveloped throughout most of Korea’s
economic history and curb-market loans, which were freely available, were very expensive4. The
result was a highly leveraged corporate sector and a banking sector whose financial health was
dependent upon that of the corporate sector.
Partly as a consequence of the government’s use of interest rate subsidies as a major
instrument of development policy, the financial structure of corporations was unsound. More
specifically, the debt-equity ratios of the Korean private corporate sector varied between 3 and 4; by
contrast, those of the US manufacturing sector have ranged between .62 in 1980 to 1.82 in 1990 (as
a result of the Reagan-Milken spate of leveraged buyouts), after which they declined to 1.5 in
19925. As a result, the debt-service ratio6of the Korean non-financial corporate sector has been
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  Computed as the ratio of interest payment to total receipts of the non-financial corporate sector
enormous: 65% in 1980, 46.4% in 1990, and 53.9% in 1992. Thus, rapid growth has been essential
to the solvency of the corporate sector, in the equivalent of a corporate Ponzi game. By the same
token, the quality of bank assets became highly dependent on the, at times precarious, solvency of
the corporate sector.
Furthermore,  the fraction of inherently more risky, government mandated, policy loans in
the balance sheets of banks was very high. Even though the proportion of new policy loans to new
total credit had dropped steadily, from a high of 100% in the seventies  to between 60 and 80
percent in the eighties to about 15 percent in the nineties, the ratio of policy loans to assets had
remained high (30% in 1992). As a result, the inherent solvency of banks was at all times
precarious: they had to be bailed out by the Central Bank periodically, and in 1992 net lending from
financial institutions to banks amounted to 43% of their total assets.  Moreover, since banks were
allowed to invest in stocks and real assets on their own account, the values of their portfolios
became directly vulnerable to asset price fluctuations as well. Like in Japan, Korea’s real estate
market went through a price bubble, rising substantially in the eighties and declining significantly
thereafter. In 1992, net real estate purchases by banks were just about as large (89%) as bank net
lending and securities constituted 28% of their total assets. And Korea’s stock market plunged from
a high value of 1000 for the Korean  Dow Jones index in 1991 to 500 in 1995. Not only were banks
vulnerable to asset-price bubbles but they were also exposed to exchange rate risk7. Between 1995
and 1997 international claims on Korean banks had risen by 30%, from 77 billion dollars to 103
billion.  It is perfectly true that the banks, both local and international, enjoyed implicit government
guarantees against the insolvency of Korean banks and could thus take higher risks8. 
Evidently, the vulnerabilities of the Korean economy have been long-standing and could, in
and of themselves, suffice to give rise to a vicious circle: an exogenously-induced decline in
exports, which are vital to the economy, would lead to stress on corporate profits and  a decline in
the rates of  growth of the economy, deteriorating the balance sheets of corporations and putting the
private banking sector’s financial viability at risk. The banks respond to these developments by a
mix of increased interest rates on loans and curtailment of credit, which, in turn, further deteriorates
the balance sheets of the corporate sector, reduces their profits and their ability to service debt, and
curtails their growth of exports and domestic sales. And thus the vicious cycle would continue.  In
the absence of timely government intervention9, a spate of corporate failures, bank failures, and
lower rates of economic growth would ensue and lead to a recession ranging in severity from
moderate, as in 1972 and 1992, to intense, as in 1981-1982.
III. Institutional Deficiencies:
The financial system of Korea is at an awkward stage of development: It is in a transitional
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state between completely nationalized and without a convertible currency, to a fully developed
market-based system that enforces prudential regulations and transparent accounting practices in
both banks and corporations.  In this connection, it is interesting to explore why two East Asian
economies, Mainland China and Taiwan, have not had financial crises like Korea’s. Mainland
China has not started its financial liberalization10: its banks are wholly government owned, by
national, regional or local banks; its currency is not convertible; and, only selective foreign
investment, under tightly controlled conditions of access and operation, is permitted.  While China’s
competitiveness and exports have been somewhat affected by Japan’s recession and by the financial
crises of other East Asian countries, and while it is estimated that the fraction of non-performing
loans held by its state banks is about 20%, the worst that can happen to China is slower overall
growth and a currency devaluation. Of course, China is also inherently less vulnerable being a large
country which is relatively closed.
At the other extreme in financial development and liberalization, we have Taiwan. Taiwan 
has followed a development strategy similar to Korea’s, with qualitatively similar vulnerabilities
(very open) but its financial system is considerably more advanced.  The degree of financial
intermediation in Taiwan is twice as high; both bank and nonbank financial institutions are more
developed; it has enjoyed double-digit savings rates considerably longer than Korea, making for
financially sounder corporate debt-equity ratios, lower domestic interest rates and higher
capitalization rates of banks; it has been running a trade surplus for the last twenty years, as a result
of which it has accumulated an extremely large reserve of foreign currency; it has been has been
exporting, rather than importing, capital; and conglomerates play a less significant role in its
industrial organization. Also, of course, much of its trade is with the Mainland, which, so far, has
been little affected.
It seems that either extreme in financial development is stable to cataclysmic financial
crises, while the middle is not.
During the sixties and seventies, Korean banks were highly controlled. During the sixties,
the control was exercised by having specialized government-owned banks for special purposes
(such as Export-Import, Agricultural Credit Bank, etc) and then, in the seventies, through direct
targeting of loans to specific firms which the government had enjoined to carry out specific
activities11.
The first moves towards financial liberalization in Korea started in 1981-83, when banks
were privatized. But, as evident from our previous chapter, privatization did not carry with it
freedom from government controls. While targeted industrial policy effectively ended with the
death of President Park, the government continued to mandate private-bank loans in support of
solvency of the corporate sector and its expansion, as well as in support of the government’s social
goals. Thus, the government encouraged banks to lend for real estate mortgages to would be home
buyers and ordered them not to call loans to corporations in 1992 and again in mid-1997. And it
established a main-bank system, borrowed from the Japanese, in which a specific bank is
designated by the government to syndicate a loan to a particular corporation for a specific activity. 
This meant that, although banks were privatized in the early eighties, policy loans persisted.  Their
continuation meant not only that banks wound up with an unsound portfolio of loans but also that
                                                
    
10
  Gong Chen 1998
    
11
 Cho Soon 1994
there was little screening of projects and of creditworthiness of borrowers and thus that the capacity
to engage in financial scrutiny of loan-applications was not developed12.  Moreover, in return for
complying with government directives on loans, banks have had, in effect, virtually unlimited
insurance against insolvency, thus encouraging them to make riskier loans13. Indeed, banks have
consistently borrowed from the Bank of Korea and the government. The institutional structure of
the banking system thus promoted the development of unsound balance-sheets in banks. 
The Korean banking system was privatized and liberalized but it has also been inadequately
regulated and supervised.  Korea’s financial system was modeled on Japan’s and built around
"relationship-banking" rather than, like the Anglo Saxon system, around "arms length"
relationships. Relationship banking gets around moral hazard issues by forging close
communication channels between borrowers and lenders, in which lenders are privy to timely
information about business conditions and plans. However, it is also open to manipulation and to
persistence of perceptions concerning a company’s soundness long after reality has changed14.
Moreover, in relationship-banking the degree of overall transparency, disclosure, and rule-based
banking supervision is low. Relationship-banking is also not well suited to globalized financial
systems, which require generalized, timely, and accurate information to function properly. 
In addition, starting with the eighties, Korea had pursued a high real interest rate policy, in
order to encourage domestic savings and attract savings away from the curb market. The intent of
the policy was to curb inflation while financing high investment rates. But this high-interest rate
policy encouraged borrowing abroad, especially during the nineties, when US (and world) interest
rates started declining. When restrictions on foreign capital inflows were lifted, both Korean banks
started borrowing heavily on the foreign market.  Between 1990 and 1995, foreign debt shot up by
70%, after declining by 68% between 1985 and 1990, and net foreign liabilities, expressed in won,
increased six-fold, to 6 billion dollars15. Nevertheless, by 1995, foreign debt was only 12% of GNP
and 44% of exports.  Most of this foreign debt represented borrowing by private banks. Naturally,
the foreign borrowing was denominated in dollars, exposing bank-borrowing to exchange rate risk.
 Since Korea was committed to maintaining a stable exchange rate, the short term debt was
unhedged. Moreover, about 80% of loans were short-term, making the solvency of banks and,
indirectly, chaebols very sensitive to fluctuations in foreign confidence in Korea’s economic
prospects. 
 Banking has, on the average, not been a profitable activity in Korea; indeed, the operating
surplus of financial institutions has consistently been negative throughout the eighties and nineties. 
Despite earlier moves to free interest rates on deposits and loans, they continued to be set by the
Ministry of Finance. Since banks were privatized in the early eighties, the spread between nominal
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time-deposit rates and general loan rates has been quite low, averaging about half a percentage
point,  and that between time-deposit rates and policy loans has been negative, ranging between -9
to -2 percentage points. Thus, there was little, if any, cushion for mistakes in lending.  When
Korean merchant and commercial banks were allowed direct access to foreign lenders, they tried to
improve their profitability by increasing the spread between loan rates to corporations and the cost
of these loans through their ready access to cheap short-term loans from foreign banks, and by
borrowing short and lending long. They also tried to improve their profitability by using some of
the funds they borrowed on international capital markets to purchase bonds and derivatives in other
developing countries (such as Brazil and Indonesia) that had less privileged access to international
financial markets.
Korea’s capital market was closed to foreigners throughout most of its development and
opened only cautiously and very gradually: Foreign banks were first allowed to have branches in
Korea in 1972, but substantial restrictions were placed on their activities. Portfolio investment by
foreigners, through special funds which bought Korean securities and whose shares were traded
only abroad, was first allowed in 1982; but these funds were limited to owning no more than 10%
of paid in capital of large domestic securities companies.  The complete prohibition on direct
foreign investment in Korean stocks was lifted only in 1992, but restrictions were placed on these
investments. Restrictions on the convertibility of the won on trade-related transactions were
revoked only in 1988. In 1985, Korean firms were allowed to raise capital abroad by issuing
convertible bonds. In 1990, a managed float exchange rate system, known as a market-average-
exchange-rate system, was adopted. In this system the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Korea
are no longer directly involved in setting exchange rates. But the bands imposed on the daily
fluctuations of the won-dollar exchange rate were narrow16 and the government continues to
exercise indirect influence on the exchange rate, through its foreign exchange transactions. Capital
account convertibility for capital inflows was started in 1991, but with substantial restrictions. The
opening up of Korea’s capital market was accelerated after 1994, in preparation for Korea’s joining
the OECD and under pressure by the United States, when several steps were taken to liberalized the
outflow of capital as well. It was envisaged that, by year 2000, Korea’s capital account transactions
will be as liberalized as that of OECD countries. This opening up permitted private-sector banks to
borrow abroad without significant oversight. Together with the high-interest rate policy, it led to a
rapid increase in foreign liabilities of banks, from 5.1% of their total liabilities in 1990 to 9% in
1995. 
Institutionally, the international financial system is also deficient. As pointed out by
Tobin17, it is too smooth, permitting the transfer of vast sums to be carried out instantaneously; it is
too large, enabling immense amounts of cash to be brought to bear on any currency at any moment
in time; and it also has an inherent tendency to overshoot, generating waves of overoptimistic risk
assessments, leading to overlending, followed by overpessimistic risk assessments, leading not only
to the cessation of new loans but also to huge withdrawals of foreign currency.
These enormous swings in capital flows constitute the essence of financial crises. 
The sheer size of the foreign exchange market is staggering. During 1993-95, the Bank for
International Settlements estimates that foreign exchange transactions averaged 1.3 trillions per
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day18. By 1997, the daily volume of foreign exchange transactions had increased to 2 trillion19!
Moreover, 80% of these transactions are reversed within 7 days and are thus clearly speculative in
nature. No country, however large and however developed can withstand that kind of onslaught and
emerge mostly unharmed. The international financial market is also inherently cyclical in nature.
Korea’s vulnerabilities were longstanding. If anything, they were more serious during the late
seventies and early eighties than they are now. However, during the seventies the banking system
was nationalized and exchange transactions tightly controlled. And during the eighties, when the
banking system was privatized, foreign capital movements and portfolio investment by foreigners
continued to be either prohibited entirely or severely limited by law.
Despite these vulnerabilities, when Korea increasingly opened up its financial capital markets in the
nineties, it enjoyed an A1 rating from international credit rating agencies, enabling it to build up
substantial foreign debt. It continued to enjoy this rating even though it was increasing its foreign
indebtedness at too high a rate. Then, about six months after the East Asian financial crisis started
in Thailand, Korea’s credit rating was downgraded precipitously, to junk bond status, making its
debt ineligible for the portfolios of international banks.
As a consequence, in late 1997, Korea experienced a huge swing in foreign capital inflows: from
about 100 billion dollars inflow to 20 billion dollar outflow. It is perfectly true that Korea had some
institutional vulnerabilities, was suffering from a mild recession, and made some policy mistakes
which made it susceptible to downgrading. But the international financial system is designed like a
crowded, high-speed highway system that demands perfect driving at all points of time from all
those who participate in it, to avoid the dangers of severe periodic disasters.
The combination of a highly-leveraged economy; a low-information, poorly regulated
domestic financial system; with an open capital market operating in a globalized financial system
which is excessively liquid is a disaster waiting to happen. Indeed, the last decade has seen 67
financial crises, two thirds of which have occurred in developing countries.
IV. Policy Mistakes:
The Korean government made several policy mistakes during the period leading up to the
crisis.
First, the government’s exchange rate management may have been  faulty. It first continued
to peg its exchange rate to the dollar, refusing to devalue in tandem with the devaluation of the yen.
 As a result, the real trade-weighted exchange rate appreciated between 1994 and 97. However, the
extent of appreciation was relatively small as the trade-weighted real exchange rate in 1997 was
only about 12% above that in 199020. The reasons for not devaluing were a mix of economic and
political: The economic arguments for a devaluation were not clearcut. On the one hand, Korea had
consistently been running a large trade deficit with Japan; the appreciation of the won relative to the
yen made imports from Japan cheaper at the same time that it made exports more expensive, raising
Korea’s real terms of trade and reducing its rate of inflation. Also, the appreciated won made debt
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servicing cheaper. Moreover, as in the case of Mexico in 1994, a devaluation might have been taken
as a sign of weakness and invited the very speculative attack which it was intended to fend off.
Finally, with an election looming in 1997, a devaluation would reduce Korea’s per capita income
below the magic figure of $10,000, and erode the claims of the ruling party to an impressive
economic performance.
On the other hand,  the result of continuing the dollar-peg during the nineties was to reduce the
competitiveness and rate of growth of exports, increase the trade deficit, and lower the rate of
growth of the economy. The rate of growth of exports fell to an average of 14% annually between
1990 and 1996 as compared to 20% between 1985 and 1990;21 the trade deficit doubled between
1990 and 1995; the current account deficit quadrupled; and the rate of growth of GNP declined
from an average of 10.8% between 1985 and 1990 to an average rate of 7.5% between 1990 and
1995.
  Then, when the currency attack on the won started, Korea made a futile attempt to defend
its overvalued exchange rate, losing about $20 billion in the process. By the end of 1997, Korea’s
net usable foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to about 12 billion dollars, or about three week’s
worth of imports and about 60% of debt falling due. In addition, the devaluation of the won
increased the debt burden on Korea’s banks and corporations22 dramatically.
 Second, government policy encouraged a very rapid rate of growth of real wages, in excess
of the rate of growth of labor productivity. Between 1987, when independent unions were first
allowed to organize, and 1994, real wages more than doubled23; relative to 1990, the index of real
wages in 1994 stood about 11 percentage points above that of labor productivity. that just before the
crisis, the  Economist indicated that the average wage level in Korea was about 30% above that of
the United Kingdom. Again, the motivation was political: to preempt the opposition parties, which
represent labor interests, from gaining popular support. It may also be true that President Kim was
genuinely populist in his orientation. In response, firms tried to automate very rapidly, an effort to
which a large fraction of corporate investment was devoted.
Third, the government adopted a high-interest rate, tight money policy, which set domestic
real interest rates way above world markets. Prior to the crisis, the nominal interest rate was about
12-13% annually (real interest rate of about 7-8%) compared to a world-market nominal rate of
about 6-7% (real rate of 3-4). This high interest rate policy was continued from the eighties and
intensified both in response to IMF pressures and in order to qualify for membership in the OECD.
Since the Korean stock market had declined by 50% relative to 1991, in response to the high
interest rates and the squeeze on corporate earnings, firms were unable to raise new equity capital
on the stock market and had to resort to borrowing. The huge interest rate differential between
domestic and foreign loans, in turn, encouraged foreign borrowing, thus deteriorating the
soundness of bank balance sheets further and endangering macroeconomic stability. As a result, the
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ratio of foreign to total liabilities  doubled between 1990 and 1995. 
These policy mistakes were costly. Their consequence was to put a severe squeeze on
corporate profits. To put the squeeze on profits in perspective, in 199224 the operating surplus net of
taxes in manufacturing was only 9.5% of manufacturing GDP. The result of the profit squeeze was
to was to force 8 out of the top 30 chaebols into bankruptcy during the first six months of 1997. In
addition, the policy mistakes also increased foreign indebtedness, and placed the solvency of the
economy at risk.
But Korea had faced similar profit squeezes and precarious financial positions of
corporations and banks before, notably in 1972, 1980-82, and 1991-92. The immediate results had
been one-to-two year recessions, but not economic meltdowns of the type Korea is experiencing
currently.  To tackle the previous crises, several emergency measures were adopted; there was some
institutional restructuring; loans to corporations were rolled over; banks were recapitalized; and
then Korea grew its way out of the solvency crises.  The major measure in 1972 was a freeze on
repayment of curb-market debt, whose effect was to make private non-bank lenders involuntarily
provide corporate solvency.  Institutional restructuring of the financial system, by privatizing
hitherto nationalized banks and increasing the role of non-bank financial intermediaries, was the
main response to  1981-83 crisis. The privatization had the effect of infusing new capital into
banks, through the purchase of equity by the private sector. In 1991-92, foreign capital inflows were
liberalized, banks were asked to roll over corporate debt and their bad debts were absorbed by the
government. In all these cases, Korea’s fundamental adjustment strategy had consisted of adopting
measures to maintain its growth rate; borrowing abroad to cover its current account deficit; and
increasing its exports to service its debt25.
By the same token, while Korea’s level of foreign debt was mounting at an unsustainable
rate, Korea had experienced much higher levels of foreign debt during its recent prior history.
Between 1980 and 1986, the ratio of its foreign debt to GNP averaged 50%, as compared to only 12
in 1996, and the ratio of its foreign debt to exports averaged 163%, as compare to only 77% in
1996. It is true that, in the eighties, only about 30% of Korea’s debt was less than one year in
maturity while 80 percent of its debt was short term in 1996. It is also true that the foreign debt of
the eighties was sovereign debt while the foreign debt of the nineties was largely private debt. But
as against that one must put the facts that, during the eighties, the Latin American debt crisis had
enhanced international concerns with lending to developing countries to almost paranoic heights; 
that, then, the interest rate on loans was variable, renegotiated at six-month intervals; and that world
interest rates stood at double-digit levels. Moreover, between 1981 and 1985, Korea’s exports were
expanding at only 5% a year while increasing at an average rate of 14% annually during 1986-96
and 15% in 1996. Also, even though Korea’s foreign debt in the nineties was not sovereign debt,
international banks correctly perceived banking debt in Korea as having an implicit government
guarantee. Nevertheless, international perception of the risk of lending to Korea actually
decreased after the first Mexican debt crisis in 1982:  during the seventies, the premium over the
London International Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) paid by Korea was 2 percentage points; it fell to .25
percentage points in the wake of the 1982 Mexican-debt crisis.26 By contrast, the rating of Korea’s
                                                
    
24
  This is the last year for which the data is available.
    
25
  Richard N Cooper 1994
    
26
  Richard N Cooper 1994
bonds by Moody’s and by Standard and Poor’s dropped abruptly from A1 prior to  June of 1997 to
junk-bond status in November 199727. Interestingly enough, between 1990 and late 1997, while
Korea’s foreign debt was building up  at an unsustainable rapid rate, its ranking was A1. Also,
during the rapid debt-buildup period, Korea’s relative Euromoney country risk rating increased from
thirtysecond most creditworthy nation among 180 in March of 93 to 22 most creditworthy in March
of 1997 28. So much for the intertemporal rationality of global financial markets!
So what was different during the present financial crisis? The two major differences were
contagion from the rest of Asia and a much more open capital market. In 1982, contagion from the
Latin American debt crisis had not spread to Korea, since Korea was correctly perceived to have
been qualitatively different in its development strategy, more successful, and therefore more
creditworthy. Banks were then under pressure to lend, since they were receiving a large inflow of
petro-dollars on which they were paying high interest rates and the rate of economic growth in the
OECD countries had plummeted. But contagion from East Asia did spread to Korea in 1997,
because international financial markets perceived it as being quite similar to the other East Asian
countries affected by financial crises. Also, the inflow of petro dollars into US banks had dropped
substantially with declining oil prices and the US was growing rapidly, so that it provided a vibrant
market for new lending. This meant that, after the 1997-98 crisis started, Korea could not adjust to
the decline in its exports and to the  decline in its corporate profits by increasing its foreign
borrowing to maintain its growth of GNP and exports and  bailing out ailing corporations and
banks, as it had done successfully in previous crises.
Thus, perhaps the critical, fundamental policy mistake of Korea was the premature
liberalization of capital its markets, which enabled private, as distinct from government, borrowing
from abroad. The drive toward premature liberalization was the result of President Kim’s desire to
join the OECD during his term in office, in order to increase his legitimacy and popular support.
Joining the OECD requires, as a precondition, free capital markets and macroeconomic stability. In
this context, it is indicative that the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 occurred only six months after she
became a member of the OECD.
The pace of liberalization of Korea’s capital account, once started, was quite rapid. In
Constraints on foreign exchange transaction on capital account were weakened substantially in
1993. In 1994, President Kim Young Sam issued a Declaration of Globalization, in preparation for
joining the OECD, which significantly accelerated the opening up of Korea’s capital markets to
foreign security firms and foreign investors. The liberalization of capital markets enabled Korea’s
private sector to rely unchecked upon foreign borrowing and thereby become excessively sensitive
to fluctuations in foreign confidence in the soundness of Korea’s economy.  When, partly as a result
of the financial turmoil in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, international banks got worried about
loans to all Asian countries and refused to roll over Korean debt, and when the credit rating of
Korea’s bonds abruptly plummeted, Korea found itself in serious trouble.
The Korean meltdown need not have taken place if Korea had waited five to seven years
before joining the OECD and used the interim period to: (1) strengthen the balance sheets of banks
and the corporate sector;(2) grant greater independence to banks in making loans; (3) increase the
capacity of banks to evaluate the financial soundness of proposed projects and the solvency of
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corporations; and (4) raise the transparency of corporate accounting practices. The combination of
exogenous shocks, vulnerabilities, institutional inadequacies and policy mistakes need only have
resulted in a (mild?) recession29, as it had during previous financial crises and external policy
shocks. 
Of course, the above statement is predicated on the assumption that, under these
circumstances, international capital markets would have recognized that Korea’s economy is
sounder than, say, Indonesia’s and not downgraded its credit rating so precipitously when crises
developed in the other East Asian economies. Alas, there is no guarantee that this would have been
the case. Despite the fact that quite substantial restructuring had taken place before the 1994
Mexican crash, international financial markets did not recognize the difference between Mexico of
1982 and Mexico twelve years later30. Moreover, the last decade has seen serious financial crises in
over twenty OECD countries, including the United States in the early 1980s, even though their
financial systems, by and large, met all of the structural criteria enumerated above.
 V. Policy Responses to the Crisis:
The initial governmental responses to the crisis were perverse. Korea was poorly situated to
tackle the crisis as it was developing.  With an election only a month away, its President, Kim
Young Sam, placed the good of the ruling political party ahead of the needs of economic
development. Moreover, like the Mexican President in 1994, President Kim had surrounded
himself with corrupt politicians, who were very influential in formulating and executing economic
policy. There were also a split on appropriate economic policy between the Ministry of Finance and
the Bank of Korea, which caused costly delays in undertaking corrective steps.
Thus, at this critical juncture, leadership commitment to development was lacking and the
government’s moves to tackle the crisis had low credibility.  Indeed, the Korean stock market
continued to drop after each major government-response to the crisis was announced, on August
25th and on November 19th of 1997.
Prior to the crisis, businessmen had repeatedly asked the President to correct the three
policy mistakes described in the previous section. But he turned a deaf ear to their pleas, putting
short-term political considerations above the needs of economic development.  Not only was
leadership commitment to development lacking but the institutional development of private
banking system, in which banks were only nominally independent of the government, made Korea’s
financial system vulnerable to corruption.  The President’s son, who was in charge of economic
policy, bartered corporate loans to financially troubled chaebols for substantial bribes, a fact for
which he is currently under indictment. Instead of correcting the policy mistakes discussed in the
previous section in a timely fashion, the President initially attempted to paper over the evolving
corporate crisis.
During 1996, a costly, and ultimately unsuccessful, bailout of Hanbo steel, the 14th largest
chaebol, was attempted. Commercial banks were forced by politicians intimately linked to
President Kim to extend new loans to Hanbo, amounting to 7.2 billion dollars, under threat of firing
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their presidents; those bank presidents who disobeyed the order to extend loans to Hanbo steel were
put in jail. Thus, corruption played a role in the loans to Hanbo steel31. Hanbo steel had been started
by a low-level retired tax official with no business experience but who maintained close personal
relationships with many corrupt politicians who were intimates of the President. Hanbo steel was
seriously mismanaged, had an astronomic debt-equity ratio of 16 and folded in January 1997,
despite the rescue attempt. Naturally, the attempted bailout of Hanbo left Korea’s merchant banks in
a precarious financial position.
During October and November 1997, an unsuccessful effort was mounted to hold the line
on the devaluation of the won, by selling foreign exchange. It used up 60% of the country’s dollar
reserves, without achieving its objective. The futility of this stabilization effort could easily have
been predicted, when one realizes that the global volume of foreign exchange transactions is 2
trillion dollars per day and that 80% of these transactions are reversed within 7 days32. In addition,
to maintain its international creditworthiness, the Bank of Korea shifted large amounts of its
reserves to offshore branches of Korean banks to help them repay the short term debt falling due by
the end of the year. The combination of these moves left the Bank of Korea with only 6 billion
dollars in usable foreign exchange reserves in early December.
In response to the string of corporate failures during the first two quarters of 1997, in
August, after about six weeks of unavailing resistance, banks were mandated by the President to
refrain from calling in loans to chaebols. In their search for liquidity, financial institutions had
previously increased their attempts to collect on loans to corporations. The mandate to refrain from
calling in loans left  banks with even more precarious balance sheets. In early December, the
government attempted to shore up large conglomerates through a combination of direct budgetary
injections of funds and large loans from the Bank of Korea. But these attempts also failed, as the
spate of corporate failures has continued. A Presidential Commission established in 1998 to
examine the soundness of the corporate sector declared 55 corporations insolvent in July of 1998.
The failed attempt to rescue Hanbo steel and the failures of the other chaebols has made it clear that
Korea’s business groups have grown both too big to be allowed to fail and too big to rescue.
Thus, the initial policy responses by Korea’s government to the crisis as it developed were
both futile and perverse: they increased the vulnerability of Korea’s financial system even further
without succeeding in solving the corporate crisis. They also ate up Korea’s cushion of foreign
exchange reserves at a juncture at which the liberalization of financial and foreign exchange
markets had made preservation of foreign exchange reserves and financial system soundness
critical. 
In November of 1997, the government announced a fundamental restructuring package to
deal with the escalating financial crisis. It entailed: enhancing the financial capacity of the Korean
Asset Management Corporation to purchase distressed assets, which would then be purchased by
the government within two years; facilitate the restructuring of financial institutions through
mergers and injections of new funds by domestic and foreign investment; provide vastly increased
deposit insurance by raising the capital of the Deposit Insurance Corporation almost tenfold;
liberalizing the capital account further by raising the limits on individual investments by foreigners 
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and guaranteeing corporate bonds with maturities over three years; and strengthen financial
disclosure standards and loan classification requirements. But, this package was announced less
than two weeks before the election, and was not viewed as credible.  So, both the stock market and
the won continued their declines.
By contrast, the responses of the corporate sector to the crisis have been totally appropriate
to the (sorry) conditions in which it found itself. Unable to roll over foreign loans, the banks could
not provide new credit to the corporate sector, even for exports, thus giving rise to a general
scramble for liquidity. The banks also increased interest rates even more, from a high of 15% to a
high of 25% in  December 1997. In response, the business groups have all cut investment rates;
have reduced management and professional salaries; sold off firms to foreign (and, where possible)
domestic buyers; reduced their degrees of diversification; and are striving to increase their
productivity and competitiveness. So far, the chaebols have more or less held the line on worker-
layoffs, except by retirement and attrition. The unemployment rate has nevertheless increased, from
about 2% in October 1997 to about 6.5% in June of 199833, largely as a result of bankruptcies of
small and medium-sized firms. While appropriate, the corporate reactions to the crisis have led to a
severe recession. It is estimated that the rate of growth of GNP during the first two quarters of 1998
has fallen to -1.5% from approximately +7.1% in the previous year. 
In late November of 1997 the government reluctantly approached the IMF for an emergency
loan. The policy responses mandated by the IMF, as part of its conditionality, were mixed. The IMF
built upon the Korean program of November 19, 1997, but required an accelerated pace of
adjustment and made the conditions of adjustment more stringent. First, to achieve a sounder
financial structure the IMF required immediate closure of 14 technically insolvent merchant banks
and two commercial banks, with full protection of depositors. The closed merchant banks constitute
about half the total number of merchant banks. The closed banks were required to submit a
restructuring plan to the Ministry of Finance and merchant banks given three months and
commercial banks four to implement it; if they do not succeed in implementing the plan, they are to
be permanently closed. In December, the government provided 11 trillion won to the two
commercial banks to initiate their recapitalization.  Other commercial banks were given four
months to compensate for impaired assets and security losses. Second, to reduce future moral
hazard problem, by the end of year 2000, the government is to withdraw its full deposit-guarantee
and replace it with more limited insurance protection. Third, to improve soundness, bank
supervision is to be strengthened by setting up an independent supervisory commission outside the
Ministry of Finance; prudential regulation is to be strengthened; and large banks will be required to
engage foreign firms to audit their books. Also, chaebols are to be required to produce consolidated
financial statements. Fourth, to increase competition in the banking system, foreign institutions are
to be allowed to participate in friendly mergers with domestic banks and permitted to acquire as
much as 100 percent stake in merchant banks. Fifth, bank governance is to be improved by the
government’s complete withdrawal from the management and lending decisions of banks; the
abolition of policy loans; and corporate bankruptcies are to be allowed to take their course. Sixth,
the IMF availed itself of the opportunity to insist on further opening of Korea’s capital markets by
raising ceilings on foreign ownership and setting a time table for eliminating restrictions on direct
access to foreign borrowing by corporations. Korea is also required to submit a time table for
complete elimination of trade barriers and trade related subsidies.  Seventh, in the macroeconomic
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area, Korea is to raise interest rates; pursue a tight monetary policy; increase its fiscal surplus to
1.5% of GNP through a combination of higher taxes and lower spending; and accumulate foreign
exchange reserves.
Though imposing a severe institutional shock upon the economy because of their
accelerated time scale, the first five provisions in the IMF agreement are appropriate remedies for
lessening chances of a future repetition of the current crisis. The sixth and seventh are controversial,
however. It is not clear how improving the access of Korean corporations to foreign borrowing (part
of the sixth provision) will help avoid a foreign debt crises in the future. It is also unclear how
macroeconomic austerity (the seventh provision) will help the adjustment process. One might
legitimately ask the following questions about these fiscal and monetary provisions: How will
increasing the credit-crunch in an already credit-starved economy that will be undergoing massive
bank closures assist economic recovery? How will imposing higher taxes on a population whose
incomes are shrinking ease the pain of restructuring? How will reducing government expenditures,
when unemployment is increasing and safety-net provisions must be raised, help ease the human
costs of Korea’s adjustment? It is not as though Korea has not already been pursuing fiscally and
monetarily prudent policies. It is also not as though Korea did not attempt to accomplish the
combination of  macroeconomic stringency and corporate restructuring in 1980-83 and fail. It is
also not as though similar medicine, imposed (legitimately) on Latin America during the eighties,
did not lead to what most development economists would call "a lost development decade", from
which most of them are just starting to emerge after more than ten years of immiseration.
It is also not clear why the macroeconomic austerity provisions were imposed at all. Pre-
Keynesian thinking? Reflex? Standard IMF boiler-plate? Or, as Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggest,
did the IMF mistakenly view  Korea’s financial crisis as a macroeconomic crisis, akin to that of
Latin America in the eighties, and recommend its standard macroeconomic fix? If so, the diagnosis
of the crisis as due to macroeconomic excesses is incorrect: Korea has had a central government
budget surplus between 1993 and 1995, and a very small deficit (.1% of GDP) in 1996; a small
trade deficit (2% of GDP in 1995 and 5% in 96) and a small capital account surplus (2.5%) over
1990-1996. While the money supply was increasing by an average annual rate of 19%, the inflation
rate averaged only 5% between 1993-1997. Also, the ratio of broad money to GNP was low for an
economy at Korea’s level of development: it was only .46 in Korea as compared with 1.7 in Taiwan
and 1.1 in Japan. There was also no indication that there was a buildup of excess capacity. Even
though overall capacity in manufacturing increased by 30% between 1990 and 1995, the operating
ratio in manufacturing rose by 3.5 percent over the period.
In addition, there already were some signs of a domestic recession before the IMF
intervention: a slowdown in the rate of economic growth in 1996 to about (sic!) 7.1%; a decrease in
the rate of growth of exports to (sic!) 15%; a decrease in corporate earnings; a rise in major
corporate failures; and an increase in inventories. Under these circumstances, tightening domestic
credit further and reducing domestic absorption-- the standard macroeconomic-crisis conditionality
imposed by the IMF-- is obviously not an appropriate medicine for Korea’s current crisis34. The
IMF defends raising interest rates further as a measure necessary to attract foreign capital35. At the
time of writing, interest rates in Korea have risen to 30% per year-- surely overkill for attracting
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foreign capital and more than enough to choke off not only investment but also most economic
activity, including exports. Indeed, international financial markets were alarmed rather than calmed
by the draconian nature of the IMF’s conditionality ;  the drastic downgrading of Korea’s credit
rating occurred after   its letter of agreement with the IMF was made public36.
It is instructive to compare Korea and Japan in this context. Both countries have been
suffering from recessions, long in Japan, short in Korea. Both countries have inherently unsound
banking systems, with a large percentage of non-performing loans (about 20% in Japan and 30% in
Korea).  Nevertheless, both countries are economic powerhouses with fundamentally sound
economies and with very high rates of national savings. Yet the remedies that the international
community has urged upon the two countries are fundamentally different: Japan has been urged to
assume the non-performing debts of its banks, create a "bridge facility" that would continue to
extend credit to its corporate sector, and reflate its economy, by, in effect, running a large fiscal
deficit.  By contrast, Korea is being forced, as a condition of IMF credit, to tighten credit even
further, close many of its banks, restructure its corporate sector and sell off corporate assets to
foreign firms at, what the Wall Street Journal describes as "bargain basement prices". In effect, with
similar ailments, the treatment of choice prescribed by the international community has been
diametrically opposed.  While Japan is being urged to shift its aggregate demand schedule outward,
Korea is being asked to shift it inward. Which remedy is appropriate? In the short run, with a
fundamentally sound economy, it would seem to us that the response urged upon Japan is the
correct response for Korea as well. After all, an adjustment strategy similar to that currently urged
on Japan had worked well in Korea during the eighties.  In the intermediate run, both Japan and
Korea need to restructure their banking systems substantially so as to make banks subject their
loans to more stringent economic scrutiny. They both also need to decrease the debt-equity ratios of
their the corporate sectors. 
Of the two countries, we are more sanguine that it is Korea that will take the appropriate
steps to reform its financial and corporate institutions swiftly. Korea is already showing every sign
of doing so: In early 1998, Korea formed a Blue Ribbon Committee to examine the solvency of
private banks. In addition, a similar committee, appointed to examine the solvency of Korea’s
corporate sector, has identified 55 insolvent large corporations. And, by March of 1998, less than
six months after the crisis broke, Korea has already stepped back from an economic abyss37 to what
is merely a severe recession. By contrast Japan is giving no indications of intentions to engage in
fundamental institutional reform. After a decade of recession, it has finally been persuaded by the
G7 countries to apply Keynesian-stimulus policy package and rescue its banking system by
assuming the banks’ bad loans without restructuring them.
Why the asymmetry in response to the economic doldrums of the two countries? In Japan’s
case, the international diagnosis was that Japan’s financial woes have been due to a prolonged
Keynesian-type recession, as evidenced by its very low rate of GNP-growth during the nineties.
And the recession has, in large part, been attributed to (chronic) underconsumption. Also, Japan is
correctly perceived as being too big to fail without severely adverse, if not cataclysmic,
consequences for the world economy on both the trade and, more importantly, capital-flow sides.
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By contrast, together with the other Asian tigers, Korea has been misdiagnosed as suffering from
overexpansionary policies, as evidenced by its continued high rate of economic growth.  The
"overexpansionary" diagnosis is being applied to Korea despite its very high rate of national savings
(35.2% of GNP in 1995); despite the fact that the ratio of its gross domestic investment to GNP was
only .9% of GNP higher than its rate of national savings in 1995; and despite a very high rate of
capacity utilization (103% in 1995 relative to 1990).  Because of the "overexpansionary" diagnosis,
Korea is, being urged to cut down on its growth through standard policies of fiscal and monetary
restraint. Korea is also, unfortunately correctly, perceived as being only at an awkward stage: big
enough so that a severe recession in Korea might cause significant declines in stock markets and
profits worldwide but not big enough so that its economic woes will lead to even a recession, let
alone economic collapse, in the world economy.
 VI. Future Prospects:
Despite its current travails, we nevertheless think that Korea’s future prospects are bright.
We  believe that, in retrospect, the current crisis will appear as a short interruption in Korea’s
growth path, which will result in strengthening its institutional structure and lead to a continuation
of its impressive past growth performance, albeit at a rate that is more consonant with the growth
rates of developed countries. The rude awakening that the current financial shock has imparted will
also vividly demonstrate to Korean policy makers that open, globalized market economies require
paying continuous attention to  good economic policy to achieve the combination of high rates of
economic growth with reasonable economic stability. 
Our optimism is based on the following considerations:
First, we judge the newly elected President, Kim Dae Jung, to be a committed individual,
who is dedicated to the pursuit of the welfare of the whole society, possessed of a great deal of
resolve, and who puts the common good above political considerations and above his personal
predilections and interests. Despite campaign  speeches against asking the IMF for a loan, once
fully apprised of the gravity of the crisis, he quickly and fully endorsed this step and obligated
himself to the  conditionality-provisions contained in the IMF loan commitment. While his
ideology is nationalistic, anti chaebol, pro-union, and pro-parliamentary democracy, in the interests
of tackling the current crisis, he has steps that go against his grain.  Though anti-business, his first
priority has been to ensure corporate survival. To that end, he has extended government guarantees
on bank loans to foreign banks so that they would roll over loans to Korean banks and thereby
enable them to finance Korean big business. However, since he favors breaking up the chaebols, he
has willingly gone along with the IMF’s conditionality, and exacted the price of substantial banking
system and corporate restructuring, in exchange. Though pro-labor, he  introduced legislation in the
National Assembly to make the firing of workers easier and warned unions that he is prepared to
use the power of the state to curb strikes.  Though nationalistic, he has introduced legislation
enlarging the scope for direct and portfolio investment by foreign entities and allowing friendly
takeovers and mergers with foreign corporations.  And though pro-parliamentary- rather-than-
presidential democracy, he strong armed the National Assembly into approving his choice of Prime
Minister and passing the necessary restructuring legislation.
Second, Koreans have again demonstrated their high levels of social commitment (social
capital) in the current disaster, once they realized its magnitude. In the past, they were willing to
work long hours under unsafe working conditions to enable Korea’s economic miracle to take place.
When the current crisis broke, women lined up at banks to surrender their gold jewelry to help
solve the acute foreign exchange shortage. Also, the corporate restructuring has been implemented
by distributing the pain so that those most able to bear it were hit first. Salary cuts and redundancies
started at the management and professional levels, in both government and corporations, and  have
only proceeded to workers with substantial delay. And, despite the innately militant character of the
Korean unions, they have been relatively quiet in the current crisis.  So, even though the population
blames the past President, his entourage, past policy-makers and the international community for
the current economic disaster, the disaster has not generated substantial political unrest.
Third, Korea is once more demonstrating its flexibility and ability to change course quickly
and in fundamental ways.  This ability was most evident in the 1980-83 period, when the
combination of assassination of President Park, second oil shock, inflation and severe recession
caused privatization of banks, led to increases in the role of markets and to attempts to introduce
measures that would enhance competition in the corporate structure. The ability to absorb change is
also evident now, in the banking system reorganization, which is well under way. The ability to 
restructure is also apparent in the business sector, where the pace of divestiture by the chaebols of
"non-core" firms, through outright sale and through partnerships and mergers with foreign
multinationals in the appropriate line of business, is proceeding very rapidly. The process has been
facilitated by the 50% devaluation and 50% drop in the stock market induced by the crisis, which
have made Korean business ridiculously  cheap, even when allowance is made for the substantial
burden of debt with which the buyer will be saddled. It has been estimated, for example, that the
entire Samsung business group, the largest conglomerate, can now be bought on Korea’s stock
market for what it would cost to erect a single one of its plants!
Last but not least, the financial response by the international community is affording Korea
the necessary breathing space. The magnitude of the financial rescue package by the IMF and
World Bank; the speed with which the emergency packages were implemented; the second-line-of-
defense bilateral loan commitments from the United States and Japan; and the roll-over and
maturity extension of loans by international banks are enabling the resumption of business activity,
especially in exports. The 50% devaluation caused by the crisis will also help the export effort,
though much of its effect is negated by the concurrent (accelerated) 50% devaluation of the yen and
the comparable devaluations of other East Asian currencies with whose exports Korea competes.
 Conclusion:
 The Korean 1997-98 crisis cannot be explained by fiscal or monetary excesses. It is not due
to a single factor but rather to a confluence in time of a multitude of factors to which
both domestic and international circumstances contributed significantly. On the domestic front we
have: lack of leadership commitment to development, major instances of corruption as well as a
drifting towards an incorrect mix of government-intervention with market forces38. The incorrect
mix consisted of: combining government-mandated, corruption-motivated loans to mismanaged
business groups, notably Hanbo, with a laissez faire attitude towards the activities of unions which
allowed them to push wages above productivity; maintaining a high interest rate regime, with too
low a spread between deposit rates and loan rates, while refusing to intervene in the foreign
exchange market to prevent overvaluation of the won; an incorrect mix of regulation and
liberalization in its financial system, characterized by very little prudential regulation of banks and
corporations combined with greater freedom in borrowing and lending; and removing controls on
financial capital markets combined with setting high domestic interest rates and maintaining
domestic financial repression.
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  On the foreign level, the most important contributing factors were the prolonged refusal by
Japan to take the necessary measures to reflate its economy and the excessively optimistic
evaluation of Korea’s creditworthiness between 1990 and 1997 followed by its excessively
pessimistic evaluation after the start of the crisis in the rest of East Asia. Thus, mistakes were made
by both borrowers (Korea), who were too eager to rely on cheap but volatile foreign short-term
loans, and lenders (banks in the rest of the world), who were initially too eager to extend them and
subsequently too quick to withdraw them. Unfortunately, Korea is paying the brunt of the cost for
these mistakes while international banks are getting off more or less scott free: international banks
have renegotiated their loans to Korean banks at higher interest rates and with the Korean
government assuming explicit legal responsibility for the repayment of loans to Korean private
banks.
One might also view the crisis as the result of a fundamental incompatibility between an
independent financial policy, which Korea tried to pursue,  with smoothly functioning, unregulated
global capital markets. Two of Korea’s major policy mistakes were in trying to have an exchange
rate policy which was out of alignment with its purchasing power parity and an interest rate which
was out of alignment with world interest rates while having largely liberalized its capital flows. The
Korean crisis demonstrates graphically that this is an economic impossibility. Global financial
markets preclude governments from having independent exchange and interest rate policies. This is
something well understood by OECD governments, as the regular, periodic G7 consultations and
the drive towards European Monetary Union demonstrate. With respect to interest rates, if, as
happened in Korea, the domestic interest rate is set above world market then the result is a buildup
of foreign indebtedness; if, as happened in Japan, the domestic interest rate is set below world
market the result is an outflow of domestic savings in the form of portfolio investment in foreign
bonds and securities and of real investment abroad; the consequence is lower domestic economic
growth.  Globalization of capital markets in a fluctuating exchange rate regime is also incompatible
with an independent exchange rate policy, especially one that attempts to peg the exchange rate. 
Attempts to maintain an overvalued currency (as in Korea) require using foreign exchange reserves
to buy foreign currency to prevent a devaluation; eventually, the supply of foreign exchange
reserves will be exhausted and the currency will devalue anyhow. Attempts to maintain an
undervalued currency (as in Japan) will, in the absence of restrictions on currency outflows, cause
an outflow of domestic currency with adverse effects on domestic investment and domestic growth.
Thus, globalization imposes severe fundamental constraints on the policy levers which
governments can exercise in their management of the domestic economy.
The crisis also demonstrates how unforgiving global capital markets are to mistakes in
economic policy and to institutional inadequacies within countries and how severe the penalties for
mistakes are.  This is not surprising to specialists in international finance. Keynes (1930), Tobin
(1974) and Davidson (1997) have long warned us about the dangerously excessive volatility of
world financial markets and urged alternative ways of restructuring them so as to make them more
robust. But the Asian economic crisis, which occurred in the best performing economies in the
world, brings this forcefully to the fore.  Thus, one important lesson from the East Asian crisis is
that international capital flows can pose serious threats to economic stability and that, iconoclastic
as it may sound, some regulation or other impediments to short-term capital flows is required39.
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